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Provisional Measures in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
Peter Tomka  and Gleider I. Hernández 
 
On the occasion of Judge and Professor Rüdiger Wolfrum’s 70th birthday, it gives us great 
pleasure to contribute to this Festschrift in his honour with a chapter on provisional measures 
in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Judge Wolfrum, as a Member of that 
Tribunal since 1996 and its President from 2005 to 2008, has greatly contributed to the 
evolution of the practice of the Tribunal and the development of its jurisprudence. Moreover, 
from both his judicial office in Hamburg and his academic office as Director of the Max-
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg, he has 
made a great contribution to the international law of the sea and to international law more 
generally. The topic of our piece is thus perhaps a fitting tribute. 
 
A. General Comments on Provisional Measures 
 
The essence of provisional measures is to protect the rights at issue of either party in a case 
pendente litis, and to prevent the extension or aggravation of a dispute. Such measures were 
designed to remedy the problem which can arise from the complex, sometimes time-
consuming nature of international judicial proceedings, and avoid an eventual judgment 
becoming meaningless in whole or in part once it is delivered.
1
 What is so interesting about a 
request for provisional measures is that the court or tribunal seised of such a request, in 
examining the causes prompting it, does not examine the nature of the dispute or the facts or 
law underlying it; instead, it aims to study emerging or existing events external to the 
proceedings, such as the conduct of the parties in general or with respect to the subject-matter 
of the dispute, and determines whether the non-indication of measures would seriously impair 
the rights to be determined later on in the eventual judgment. A strong component of judicial 
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1
 One of the classic statements justifying the indication of provisional measures was given by the International 
Court of Justice in Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland; Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Iceland), Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports 1972, 16, para. 21, and 34, para. 22: “Whereas the right of the 
Court to indicate provisional measures as provided for in Article 41 of the Statute has its objective to preserve 
the respective rights of the Parties pending the decision of the Court, and presupposes that irreparable 
prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings, and that the 
Court’s judgements should not be anticipated by reason of any initiative regarding the measures which are in 
issue …”. 
  
discretion therefore permeates the very nature of provisional measures, although, in the case 
law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at least, some criteria have been articulated 
which help to define objectively the exercise of the power to indicate provisional measures.
2
 
 
ITLOS is not in a formal relationship with the ICJ, as both bodies stand independent of and 
separate from each other; yet in substance, there is a relationship between the two which 
follows from the fact that the substantive competences of both institutions are broadly situated 
in the field of the peaceful settlement of international disputes through judicial means.
3
 There 
are of course differences in competence ratione materiae between the ICJ and the Tribunal. 
The ICJ has wider material jurisdiction over legal inter-state disputes in all areas of 
international law, whilst the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is confined to the interpretation or 
application of UNCLOS or an international instrument related to the purposes of UNCLOS.
4
 
However, when establishing the UNCLOS regime, negotiating states were certainly 
influenced by the law and practice of the International Court.
5
 In the light of both this and the 
Court’s extensive practice in the area of provisional measures, coupled with the fact that the 
Tribunal’s procedure was designed in the light of that experience, the Tribunal’s provisional 
measures proceedings may rightly – and usefully – be compared to those of the Court. 
 
B. Structure of ITLOS and its Relationship with UNCLOS 
 
I. Article 290 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Annex VI thereof 
 
The creation of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, a tribunal specifically 
designed to resolve disputes relating to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
                                                 
2
 S. Rosenne, Provisional Measures in International Law (2005), provides the most comprehensive and thorough 
study of provisional measures at the two institutions; see also S. Torres Bernárdez, Provisional Measures and 
Interventions in Maritime Delimitation Disputes, in: R. Lagoni/D. Vignes (eds.), Maritime Delimitation, 33, at 
41 et seq (2006).  
3
 C.-A. Fleischauer, The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Newly Created 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, 1 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 
327, at 330 (1997). 
4
 Article 288, paras. 1 and 2, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 
UNTS 397, hereinafter “UNCLOS”. 
5
 S. Rosenne (note 2), at 46, explains in detail how, for example, the concept of prima facie jurisdiction over the 
merits was introduced into the Convention following the development of that notion by the ICJ. He also 
expresses the view that Article 290, paras. 1 to 4, of UNCLOS represents a codification or a 
codification/restatement of the ICJ’s law and practice. See also B. H. Oxman, The Rule of Law and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 7 European Journal of International Law 353, 367 (1996); D. L. 
Morgan, Implication of the Proliferation of International Legal Fora: The Example of the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Cases, 43 Harvard Journal of International Law 541, at 542-543 (2002). 
  
was an important innovation in the area of international dispute settlement for a number of 
reasons. The first reason is the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism on the 
interpretation or application of UNCLOS put in place by part XI, section 5,
6
 and part XV, 
section 2,
7
 of that Convention. Together, they provide a series of specific mechanisms ranging 
from conciliation to arbitration to judicial recourse to ITLOS for the compulsory settlement of 
disputes; the panoply of choice, announced as the Convention’s “first principle”,8 was the 
result of the much-heralded “package deal” embodied within the Convention.9 Interestingly, 
ITLOS is only one of several specific mechanisms applicable to settling disputes under 
UNCLOS, alongside recourse to the International Court of Justice as well as conciliation and 
arbitral mechanisms of varying shades.
10
 With respect to the ICJ at least, the parallel 
possibility of the seising of that court or ITLOS bespeaks of the structural similarities between 
the two judicial institutions. 
 
Another interesting point is that non-state entities are also accorded procedural standing in 
connection with activities in the international seabed area, for which a separate chamber exists 
within the ITLOS system.
11
 This is an important distinction as compared to the system of the 
ICJ, where only states may be parties to disputes;
12
 and, in fact, it is one of the main reasons 
why the main rules, both substantive and procedural, relating to ITLOS were specifically 
embodied in UNCLOS. 
 
The special nature of ITLOS transcends the jurisdiction conferred thereupon by UNCLOS and 
derives primarily from the specific part it plays in the entire UNCLOS system; besides 
hearing cases over which it has jurisdiction on the merits, it was also designed as “the 
ultimate safeguard always available for all purposes to ensure that recourse to the compulsory 
dispute settlement procedures under the Convention would not be frustrated on technical 
                                                 
6
 Articles 186-191 UNCLOS. 
7
 Articles 286-299 UNCLOS, together with Annexes V (conciliation), VI (ITLOS), VII (arbitration) and VIII 
(special arbitration). 
8
 C. F. Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction of Specific International Tribunals, at 257 (2009). 
9
 S. Rosenne (note 2), at 44.  
10
 Article 287 UNCLOS. The arbitral tribunals can be constituted under Annex VII (“arbitral tribunal”) or 
Annex VIII (“special arbitral tribunal”); S. Rosenne (note 2), at 45, explains that the main approach in 
UNCLOS is based on the “principle of the freedom of choice of dispute settlement procedure embodied in 
Articles 33 and 95 of the Charter”. 
11
 Part XI, section 5, of UNCLOS. Although not a dispute, on 11 May 2010 that Chamber was requested by the 
Council of the International Seabed Authority to give the first advisory opinion of the Tribunal on the 
“Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the 
International Seabed Area”: see ITLOS Press Release No. 147 (14 May 2010). 
12
 Article 35, para. 1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as annexed to the Charter of the United 
Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS xvi. 
  
grounds”.13 It is against this background that one must understand the highly specific 
arrangements for provisional measures of protection developed in Article 290 UNCLOS 
which are applicable to ITLOS. These arrangements were both necessary to cover the variety 
of courts and tribunals, all vested with jurisdiction under the Convention, as well as to settle 
without ambiguity the binding nature of such provisional measures laid down in Article 290, 
paragraph 6, of UNCLOS.
14
 
 
An interesting illustration of the cross-fertilization of the jurisprudence of ITLOS with that of 
the ICJ in matters relating to provisional measures relates to the binding nature of such 
measures.
15
 Article 290 UNCLOS, when read together with Annex VI (hereinafter the 
“ITLOS Statute”), Article 25, differs markedly from the analogous provision of the ICJ 
Statute, Article 41, even though provisional measures indicated by the ICJ are also binding, as 
clarified in the LaGrand judgment of 2001.
16
 It has been argued that the establishment of 
ITLOS served to alert the ICJ that another international jurisdiction in the United Nations 
system had the express authority to order binding provisional measures, which perhaps 
signalled to the ICJ that it should pronounce definitively on the issue.
17
 It bears recalling, 
however, that as early as 1939 the Permanent Court of International Justice had already stated 
                                                 
13
 S. Rosenne (note 2), at 45. This particular aspect of its role is most apparent in the power it has under Article 
290, para. 5, of UNCLOS to prescribe provisional measures in cases where an arbitral tribunal has yet to be 
constituted. See infra section C.I for further discussion. 
14
 S. Rosenne (note 2), at 45, notes that Article 290 was also designed to avoid the ambiguity existing in 1982 
regarding the binding force of an order of the ICJ indicating provisional measures, which was finally settled 
by that court in LaGrand (Germany v. United States), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, 501-506, esp. para. 102; 
A. Tzanakopoulos, Provisional Measures Indicated by International Courts: Emergence of a General Principle 
of International Law, 57 Revue hellénique de droit international 53, at 73 (2004), argues that Article 290, para. 
6, of UNCLOS represents the “crystallisation” of a general principle as to the binding force of provisional 
measures.  
15
 G. Eiriksson, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, at 219 (2000), argued that the binding nature 
of provisional measures according to UNCLOS is reflected in the term “prescription”, which obviated the 
doctrinal debate existing before the LaGrand judgment at the ICJ as that court has the power to “indicate” 
provisional measures under Article 41 of its Statute. 
16
 See F. Orrego Vicuña, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and Provisional Measures: Settled 
Issues and Pending Problems, 22 (3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 451, at 452-453 (2007), 
who suggests that Article 290 pointed towards a major shift which would crystallise at the ICJ in the LaGrand 
decision; R. Wolfrum, Provisional Measures of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in: P.C. 
Rao/R. Khan (eds.), The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Law and Practice, 173, at 180 (2001); 
T. A. Mensah, Provisional Measures in the ITLOS, Heidelberg Journal of International Law 43, at 45 (2002); 
T. Treves, Provisional Measures Pending the Constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal, Studi di Diritto 
Internazionale in Onore di Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, 1243, at 1253 (2004), all explain that whatever the position 
with regard to orders indicating provisional measures under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute might have been 
before and after LaGrand, there has never been any doubt as to the binding nature of provisional measures 
prescribed pursuant to Article 290, para. 6, of UNCLOS. The same “binding” nature of provisional measures 
was noted by an ICSID arbitral tribunal in Emilio Agustín Mafezzini v. Spain, Case no. ARB/97/7, Decision on 
Request for Provisional Measures of 28 October 1999, 5 ICSID Reports 393.  
17
 A. Tzanakopoulos (note 14), at 77. 
  
that Article 41 of its Statute “applies the principle universally accepted by international 
tribunals … to the effect that the parties to a case must abstain from any measure capable of 
exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of the decision to be given and, in 
general, not allow any step of any kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend the 
dispute”.18 The ICJ in LaGrand referred to this principle as a “related reason which points to 
the binding character of orders made under Article 41”.19 
 
II. The Procedural Framework Established in the Rules of the Tribunal 
 
Although its powers to indicate provisional measures derive from Article 290 UNCLOS and 
the ITLOS Statute, especially Article 25, the Tribunal was left to frame specific rules for 
carrying out its functions under Article 16 of its Statute. In particular, the Tribunal was left 
free to develop its own rules of procedure. Proceeding at the time of its inauguration on the 
basis of an interim set of Rules prepared by Committee IV of the Preparatory Commission for 
the International Seabed Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, it 
adopted its own Rules of the Tribunal on 28 October 1997 and has periodically amended them 
since.
20
 The Rules relating to provisional measures, Articles 89 to 95, lay out a detailed 
procedure inspired by the practice of the ICJ,
21
 but there are some differences of note. The 
Tribunal’s Rules specifically establish that the Tribunal, unlike the ICJ, shall give priority to 
Applications for the release of vessels or crews over all other proceedings before it.
22
 
Accordingly, if the Tribunal is seised of an Application for prompt release of a vessel or crew 
and of a request for the prescription of provisional measures, these two types of proceedings 
are handled without delay, but separately.
23
 Further, under Article 95 of the Rules, parties 
have an obligation to report to the Tribunal as to their compliance with any provisional 
                                                 
18
 Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v. Bulgaria), PCIJ 1939, Series A/B, No. 79, 199 
(emphasis added). 
19
 LaGrand (Germany v. United States), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, 503, para. 103. 
20
 The Rules of the Tribunal, most recently amended on 17 March 2009, are available on ITLOS’ website as 
Doc ITLOS/8; T. Treves, The Rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in: P. C. Rao/R. 
Khan (eds.), The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 135, at 159 (2001), has concluded that the 
Rules of the Tribunal have their roots in the tradition of the rules concerning proceedings before the 
International Court of Justice. 
21
 S. Rosenne (note 2), at 76. 
22
 Article 112, para. 1, of the Rules of the Tribunal. 
23
 S. Rosenne (note 2), at 79, explains that at the ICJ it would fall on the Court in consultation with the parties to 
ensure this. 
  
measures prescribed by the Tribunal;
24
 such reporting is in the form of a report upon the steps 
a party has taken or proposes to take in order to ensure prompt compliance.
25
 
 
Interpretation of the Rules by the Tribunal has been relatively sparse. In M/V "SAIGA" (No. 2) 
the Tribunal recalled Article 95, paragraph 2, and considered that it would be appropriate to 
authorize the President of the Tribunal to request further information on the implementation 
of the provisional measures prescribed in that order.
26
 It has followed a similar practice 
since,
27
 suggesting that ITLOS considers such provision a matter of routine. Rosenne has 
hinted that it is open to question whether Article 290 of the Convention intended the Tribunal 
to have carte blanche to request reports from parties in cases before it as to their 
implementation of orders prescribing provisional measures,
28
 and has suggested that it is 
rather unclear what the Tribunal can do with the reports it receives, as provisional measures 
may be prescribed, modified or revoked only at the request of a party to a dispute and after the 
parties have been given an opportunity to be heard.
29
 
 
III. Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae 
 
Given that proceedings on a request for the indication of provisional measures may have to be 
considered before a court or tribunal is fully satisfied that it has jurisdiction over a given case, 
these requests necessarily proceed in a manner different from other incidental proceedings. 
Accordingly, the special rules of jurisdiction governing requests for provisional measures tend 
                                                 
24
 This is in contrast with Article 78 of the ICJ Rules of Court, according to which the Court “may request 
information from the parties on any matter connected with the implementation of any provisional measures it 
has indicated”. A recent, and rare, example of the ICJ asking the Parties to inform the Court about compliance 
with its order may be found in the Case concerning Application of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Order, ICJ Reports 2008, 
399, para. 149 (D); S. Rosenne (note 2), at 79, recalls that Article 85 of the draft Rules of ITLOS foresaw a 
similar provision for ITLOS. 
25
 S. Rosenne (note 2), at 79, explains that this provision was of the Tribunal’s initiative (section 3.8). See also 
ITLOS, Reclamation of Land by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Order 
on Provisional Measures of 8 October 2003, ITLOS Reports 2003, 10, hereinafter “Land Reclamation”, 26, 
para. 104, where the Tribunal extended the duty to report to include reporting to the Annex VII arbitral 
tribunal unless that tribunal should decide otherwise.  
26
 ITLOS, M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Order on Provisional Measures 
of 11 March 1998, ITLOS Reports 1998, hereinafter “M/V ‘SAIGA’ (No.2)”, 2, 24. It was included in the 
operative provision, 39 (para. 50). 
27
 See ITLOS, Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Order on Provisional 
Measures of 27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, 280, 297, hereinafter “Southern Bluefin Tuna”; ITLOS, 
MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Order on Provisional Measures of 3 December 2001, ITLOS 
Reports 2001, 91, hereinafter “MOX Plant”; and Land Reclamation (note 25), 28. 
28
 S. Rosenne (note 2), at 80. 
29
 Id. 
  
to be tailored to a particular judicial organ and to the manner in which its jurisdiction is to be 
established. In this regard, the settlement of disputes under UNCLOS is highly specific and 
somewhat more regulated than the relatively unsystematic character of the general law 
relating to the settlement of international disputes. 
 
The basic conditions for prescribing provisional measures under Article 290 UNCLOS must 
be read against the requirement that the court or tribunal must have jurisdiction in accordance 
with part XV of that Convention, and that compulsory proceedings must already be brought 
under Article 286 UNCLOS. It goes without saying that any finding as to the prima facie 
jurisdiction in a given case in no way prejudges the question of jurisdiction on the merits and 
leaves unaffected the right of the other party to submit arguments against such jurisdiction. As 
regards the Tribunal specifically, its powers to prescribe provisional measures are described 
under Articles 21 and 25 of its Statute. 
 
A dispute may be submitted to ITLOS under a specific title of jurisdiction; however, if no 
such agreement is invoked, the Convention itself can serve as a title of jurisdiction permitting 
unilateral applications to the Tribunal.
30
 This may prove complex if, under UNCLOS, some 
other compulsory dispute settlement mechanism is also competent, as in that case the Tribunal 
must also take into account the specific procedural requirements of that mechanism. 
 
If the parties to a dispute cannot agree as to a mode of settlement by recourse to section 1, 
section 2 (Articles 286-296) establishes the mechanisms which may be designated for dispute 
settlement. Under Article 286, the dispute may be submitted at the request of any party to any 
of the bodies listed under Article 287 (the ICJ, ITLOS, an ad hoc arbitral tribunal under 
Annex VII, and a special arbitral tribunal under Annex VIII).
31
 Article 288, described earlier, 
defines the jurisdiction of whichever court or tribunal may eventually be seised, as being over 
the interpretation or application of UNCLOS or an international instrument “related to the 
purposes of [UNCLOS]”.32 
 
                                                 
30
 Id., at 88. 
31
 Should the parties have each chosen a different procedure or neither of them made a choice arbitration under 
Annex VII becomes obligatory. A detailed history of this provision may be found in S. Rosenne, UNCLOS III 
- The Montreux (Riphagen) Compromise, in: A. Bos (ed.), Realism in Law-Making, Essays on International 
Law in Honour of Willem Riphagen, 169 (1986).  
32
 Article 288, para. 1, of UNCLOS.  
  
It may thus be said that the Tribunal can safely adjudge disputes on the issues falling within 
the above provisions, and certainly ITLOS would have jurisdiction over disputes relating to 
the delimitation of maritime spaces as described above. An unresolved question relates to 
whether the Tribunal would also have jurisdiction over cases, submitted to it by States, having 
a mixed subject-matter which encompasses both maritime delimitation and land delimitation 
or other territorial questions.
33
 Because such mixed territorial/maritime disputes are disputes 
involving the determination of sovereignty or other territorial rights over continental or 
insular territory, the question remains open whether the maritime aspects of the delimitation 
retain an exclusively maritime character or whether these would be inextricably intertwined 
with territorial questions falling outside UNCLOS (and ipso facto outside the competence of 
the Tribunal).
34
 
 
IV. The Operation of Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae in Relation to Article 290 UNCLOS 
 
Under Article 288 UNCLOS, jurisdiction ratione materiae for ITLOS may exist over two 
types of disputes: under paragraph 1 a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of 
the Convention;
35
 and under paragraph 2 a dispute concerning the interpretation or application 
of an international agreement relating to the purposes of the Convention which is submitted to 
the competent court or tribunal in accordance with the agreement.
36
 Accordingly, Article 290 
envisages two distinct types of proceedings for provisional measures which are relevant for 
ITLOS.
37
 Article 290, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS, which is applicable to all judicial bodies 
empowered under Article 287 (the ICJ, ITLOS, ad hoc arbitral tribunal and a special arbitral 
tribunal under Annexes VII and VIII), envisages what Rosenne terms “normal” provisional 
measures proceedings, modelled on the general practice of the ICJ and intended to afford 
protection to the rights of all parties so long as the proceedings are in progress.
38
 Proceedings 
under Article 290, paragraph 1, of the Convention may be submitted at any time during the 
                                                 
33
 See S. Torres Bernárdez (note 2), at 39-40. This would be especially relevant in matters submitted through 
agreements “related to the purposes of UNCLOS”. 
34
 S. Torres Bernárdez (note 2), at 39-40, however, considers that the “mere determination of baselines for the 
purpose of a maritime delimitation does not deprive a dispute of its exclusive maritime character. The same 
conclusion applies to disputes in which to effect the maritime delimitation concerned account must be taken of 
the land frontier as existing between the parties”. 
35
 Articles 279, 286, and 288, para. 1, of UNCLOS. 
36
 Article 288, para. 2, of UNCLOS. 
37
 The full commentary on Article 290 UNCLOS may be found in M.H. Nordquist/S. Rosenne/L. Sohn (eds.), 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, hereinafter “UNCLOS 
Commentary”, Vol V, at 52 et seq. (1989). 
38
 S. Rosenne (note 2), at 46. 
  
course of proceedings. Paragraph 1 of Article 290 goes further than merely protecting the 
rights of the parties: it also allows for provisional measures “to prevent serious harm to the 
marine environment”, a wholly distinct purpose, but one which surely makes sense, given that 
the Convention devotes its part XII entirely to the protection of the marine environment as an 
integral part of the then-new law of the sea.
39
 
 
Article 290, paragraph 3, of the Convention also defines the powers of the Tribunal to 
prescribe provisional measures differently from Article 41 of the ICJ Statute; the Tribunal 
may prescribe, modify or revoke such measures only when this is requested by a party to the 
dispute and after the parties have been given the opportunity to be heard. This is not a minor 
point, given that the ICJ may prescribe provisional measures proprio motu, even without 
hearing both parties;
40
 conversely, the Tribunal must rely on the initiative of the parties.
41
 
Orrego Vicuña suggests that this limited power provides grounds for those who believe that 
the Tribunal cannot prescribe recommendations but only provisional measures, in contrast to 
the Tribunal’s decision in M/V "SAIGA" (No. 2), and that the Tribunal is necessarily 
prevented from prescribing ex parte provisional measures, i.e. measures prescribed without 
having heard the other party.
42
 
 
The M/V "SAIGA" (No. 2) case is particularly interesting since both a provisional measure and 
a recommendation were made at the same time, and the Tribunal further decided that the 
obligation to inform it on compliance referred to both. The issue has therefore been raised as 
to whether the Tribunal has the power to issue mere recommendations and whether it is 
appropriate to extend the obligation on parties to inform it about the follow-up or 
                                                 
39
 As R. Wolfrum (note 16), at 176, notes, reference to such justifications for provisional measures adds a new 
element to their link with the interests of the parties but also “reflects a change of international law from a 
mechanism providing for the coordination of States activities to one which also recognises and preserves 
common values of the community of States”. 
40
 Exceptionally, due to very particular circumstances, the ICJ in LaGrand indicated provisional measures 
without being able to provide the United States, the Respondent in that case, with the opportunity to be heard: 
see LaGrand (Germany v. United States), Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports 1999, 9, esp. 14. The ICJ thus 
exceptionally departed from Article 74, para. 3, of its Rules, which provide for a hearing which will afford the 
parties an opportunity to present their views. 
41
 Article 290, para. 3, of UNCLOS; however, G. Eiriksson (note 15), at 220, emphasizes the fact that under 
Article 89, para. 5, of the Tribunal’s rules it may prescribe measures different in whole or in part from those 
requested, and that “it would not have been in keeping with its judicial function were it to have denied itself 
the right to act outside of the strict terms of the request”.  
42
 F. Orrego Vicuña (note 16), at 455; T. A. Mensah (note 16), at 48, suggests that such a reading derives 
necessarily from a joint reading of paras. 1 and 5 of Article 290. 
  
implementation of such recommendations as well.
43
 Orrego Vicuña has suggested that in so 
doing, the Tribunal might be acting outside the scope of its jurisdiction, although this “would 
hardly be a justifiable conclusion”.44 Yet, for all this, Article 89, paragraph 5, of the Rules of 
the Tribunal does provide for the power to prescribe measures “different in whole or in part 
from those requested”, suggesting that this concern may be misplaced; moreover,  the 
Tribunal has relied upon this provision to adopt measures not requested by the parties in three 
cases.
45
 Treves has suggested that Article 89, paragraph 5, of the Rules indicates that “the 
Tribunal interprets Article 290, paras. 1 and 2, of the Convention as meaning that, while the 
Tribunal cannot initiate proceedings for provisional measures, once provisional measures 
have been duly requested, the Tribunal is free to decide measures different from those 
requested”.46 
 
Although Article 290, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS outlines the general regime of provisional 
measures of protection under that Convention, the ITLOS Statute separately addresses the 
procedural aspects connected with the constitution and operation of ITLOS and the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber. Article 25 thereof expressly links the procedural rules for ITLOS with 
Article 290 of the Convention,
47
 thus confirming that the Tribunal’s powers to indicate 
provisional measures derive from Article 290. 
 
Article 25, paragraph 2 of the ITLOS Statute allows the Tribunal’s Chamber of Summary 
Procedure, a reserve organ for when the Tribunal is not in session or there is no quorum, to 
indicate provisional measures; this is a major innovation when compared to the practice of the 
International Court of Justice.
48
 Measures so prescribed are of course subject to review and 
revision by the full Tribunal itself, presumably once a quorum of its Members (eleven 
                                                 
43
 F. Orrego Vicuña (note 16), at 453, referring to M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) (note 26), Declaration of Judge Vukas, 
ITLOS Reports 1998, 41-42, paras. 3-4, and S.S. González Napolitano, Las Medidas Provisionales en Derecho 
Internacional ante las Cortes y Tribunales Internacionales, 191 (2004). 
44
 F. Orrego Vicuña (note 16), at 454. 
45
 ITLOS, Southern Bluefin Tuna (note 27), para. 90. 1. a, b; MOX Plant (note 27), para. 89. 1; Land 
Reclamation (note 25), para. 101. 
46
 T. Treves (note 16), at 1251. 
47
 This was intentional: see UNCLOS Commentary (note 37), Vol V, 389. 
48
 Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, when read together with Article 57 of the current ICJ Rules of Court, requires 
the Court to be convened forthwith if it is not in session. Although the President had wider powers in past 
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Members of the Tribunal
49
) has been attained.
50
 Interestingly, the context of reviewing 
provisional measures so adopted is the only situation in which the Tribunal can proceed 
proprio motu.
51
 This surely makes sense: while no one suggests that the Chamber of 
Summary Procedure would necessarily give a broad interpretation of the measures to be 
adopted, the fact that they are subject to review illustrates the need for judicial prudence, as 
measures adopted thereby are “still more provisional than any other provisional measure 
prescribed by the Tribunal”.52 
 
There are only a few cases in which ITLOS has ordered provisional measures pursuant to 
Article 290 of UNCLOS. The request for provisional measures in M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) was 
originally submitted to the Tribunal under Article 290, paragraph 5,
53
 with the merits of the 
dispute to be submitted to an arbitral tribunal yet to be constituted under Annex VII to 
UNCLOS. However, following an agreement by the parties that the dispute be deemed to 
have been submitted to ITLOS, the request for provisional measures, originally filed under 
paragraph 5, was considered duly submitted under paragraph 1 of Article 290.
54
 The requests 
in Southern Bluefin Tuna, the MOX Plant Case and Land Reclamation were all submitted 
under paragraph 5 of Article 290. These requests were filed in anticipation of an arbitral 
tribunal eventually being constituted.
55
 These four cases will be referred to in the sections 
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which follow to illuminate the relevant treaty provisions and rules so far as the practice of the 
Tribunal on provisional measures is concerned.
56
 
 
C. The Criteria for the Prescription of Provisional Measures 
 
There are three particular aspects of provisional measures in which the Tribunal has given 
valuable clarification or made other contributions which may be of interest for other courts 
and tribunals: the Tribunal’s findings on prima facie jurisdiction, on urgency, and on the 
preservation of the marine environment. We will discuss these in turn. 
 
I. Prima Facie Jurisdiction 
 
In so far as Article 290 refers to the prima facie jurisdiction of ITLOS (or of another 
competent court or tribunal), broadly speaking, it incorporates the general law as developed 
by the ICJ regarding its jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures. As discussed earlier, 
ITLOS’ prima facie jurisdiction based on both paragraphs 1 and 5 of Article 290 is the same 
low threshold jurisdiction as that required by the ICJ to exercise its provisional measures 
jurisdiction. Although it has never done so, it is conceivable that, when considering the prima 
facie jurisdiction requirement in connection with a request in limine, ITLOS might conclude 
as to the existence of a manifest lack of jurisdiction on the merits, thus following the practice 
of the ICJ on the matter.
57
 Although under paragraph 1 the Tribunal undertakes a judicial 
function common to that of other courts and tribunals, under paragraph 5 it is considering 
                                                                                                                                                        
the case, the Tribunal concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to proceed to the merits, although it did find, at 
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whether it is appropriate to prescribe provisional measures in a dispute of which the merits 
will be addressed later by another body; moreover, the measures it prescribes will be 
addressed to parties which have not accepted its jurisdiction in respect of the dispute.
58
 
 
It is clear that requests for provisional measures are incidental in nature, always confined to 
the framework of proceedings on the related principal case, and that as such they do not have 
an autonomous procedural life.
59
 For this reason, it is important for a court or tribunal to 
satisfy itself that, at least on the prima facie level, it would have jurisdiction to decide on the 
merits of the case. ITLOS shares with the ICJ the notion that it must have prima facie 
jurisdiction over the merits of a case before indicating provisional measures. Prima facie 
jurisdiction does not require that the court or tribunal concerned definitively satisfy itself that 
it (or in the case of ITLOS, being seised under Article 290, paragraph 5, of UNCLOS, that the 
arbitral tribunal eventually to be constituted) has jurisdiction on the merits of the case before 
indicating provisional measures; however, it does mean that the court or tribunal ought not to 
indicate such measures unless the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to 
afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the court or the tribunal over the merits of the case 
might be founded.
60
 In the orders issued pursuant to challenges to the competence of the 
Tribunal or to that of an eventual arbitral tribunal, ITLOS has used this formulation 
consistently.
61
 
 
Although the findings as to prima facie jurisdiction have been unanimous and may be taken to 
suggest a broad approach to jurisdiction by the Tribunal, on close examination this proves not 
to be wholly accurate. The low threshold established in the prima facie jurisdiction test makes 
it no surprise; the question to be decided is not whether there is conclusive proof of 
jurisdiction, but rather whether jurisdiction is not so “obviously excluded” as to make it 
extremely unlikely that the merits of the dispute will actually be considered by the court or 
tribunal which will be deciding on the merits.
62
 For example, in Southern Bluefin Tuna 
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ITLOS found that prima facie the Annex VII Tribunal would have jurisdiction to deal with 
the merits of the case, yet the arbitral tribunal later constituted finally concluded that it did not 
have jurisdiction.
63
 This does not imply that the arbitral tribunal overruled ITLOS, as the two 
bodies would be applying different jurisdictional tests, and that the arbitral tribunal did not 
bind itself to ITLOS’ preliminary findings, but instead based its award on the more extensive 
arguments and submissions of the parties on the merits.
64
 Moreover, the arbitral tribunal 
explicitly noted that the revocation “did not mean that the parties may disregard the effects of 
the Order or their own decisions made in conformity with it”.65 In this respect, Judge 
Wolfrum’s warning that “provisional measures should not anticipate a judgment on the 
merits”66 has been heeded. Provisional measures should not constitute an interim judgment in 
favour of part of the claim. 
 
Article 290, paragraph 5, of UNCLOS contains a unique residual power for ITLOS to 
prescribe provisional measures of protection in a case in which the competent procedure for 
the binding settlement of a dispute falls under Article 288, but the request for provisional 
measures is made before the States concerned have duly constituted an arbitral tribunal. The 
residual power contained in paragraph 5 has been applied in the Southern Bluefin Tuna, MOX 
Plant and the Land Reclamation Cases, which confirms that it is not merely a theoretical 
course of action.
67
 In all of these, the Tribunal confirmed that the standard for deciding on 
prima facie jurisdiction is no different from the standard for deciding on its own 
jurisdiction.
68
 
The first condition for the prescription of provisional measures by ITLOS under Article 290, 
paragraph 5, of UNCLOS is the filing by a party of a request to that effect; such a request may 
be submitted: (a) at any time if the parties have so agreed; or (b) at any time after two weeks 
from the notification to the other party of a request for provisional measures if the parties 
have not agreed that such measures be prescribed by another court or tribunal.
69
 
 
In such circumstances, ITLOS may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures of 
protection if it considers that prima facie the tribunal which is constituted would have 
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jurisdiction over the merits and that the urgency of the situation so requires. Given that from 
the outset Applicants to ITLOS have always alleged a breach of one or more of the provisions 
of the Convention whatever other allegations have been made, the Tribunal has been able to 
regard itself or the Annex VII arbitration tribunal as having prima facie jurisdiction, provided 
of course that it be satisfied that other conditions of the Convention have been met.
70
 The 
Tribunal does this even when a dispute exists between the parties as to whether the competent 
court or tribunal has jurisdiction over the merits, leaving that question for determination by 
the competent court or tribunal.
71
 However, since in these circumstances ITLOS is not seised 
of the merits of the case, Article 89, paragraph 4, of the Rules of the Tribunal requires a 
special procedure for the institution of proceedings for provisional measures, as outlined 
under paragraph 5 thereunder.
72
 That procedure is designed so that ITLOS has a first 
opportunity for a judicial examination of the claim, even if its conclusions are provisional and 
are not binding on the court or tribunal seised of the principal claim.
73
 In MOX Plant, 
Southern Bluefin Tuna and Land Reclamation the Tribunal exercised this residual power to 
prescribe provisional measures pending the establishment of the arbitral tribunal to which the 
dispute was being submitted.
74
 
 
Other examples are illustrative. In M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) (Provisional Measures), the parties 
disagreed on whether ITLOS had jurisdiction, despite the fact that they had both agreed to 
submit the case to it and that, once seised, the Tribunal should deal with all aspects of the 
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case, including jurisdictional objections, in a single phase.
75
 The Tribunal found that it was 
sufficient for it to be satisfied that the provisions invoked by the Applicant appeared prima 
facie to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Tribunal could be founded, and that this 
was indeed the case.
76
 In Southern Bluefin Tuna the Tribunal held similarly, adding that under 
Article 281, paragraph 1 UNCLOS a State Party is not obliged to pursue procedures under 
part XV, section 1, when it concludes that the possibilities of settlement have been 
exhausted.
77
 
 
II. Urgency 
 
Urgency is a matter of procedure, relevant to the convening of the Tribunal if it is not in 
session when the request is made. However, it is also a matter of substance in so far as it is 
amongst the circumstances considered by the Tribunal in justifying the indication or 
prescription of provisional measures.
78
 Although urgency is not mentioned formally in Article 
290, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS, it can be said to be implied in the term “under the 
circumstances” which requires the competent court or tribunal to consider the individual 
circumstances of the case at hand.
79
 In any event, paragraph 5 of that same Article expressly 
provides that “the urgency of the situation” is a requirement for the prescription of provisional 
measures by ITLOS when the merits of the dispute are being submitted to arbitration under 
Annex VII or Annex VIII and the arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted. Finally, the 
Tribunal has formally set the requirement for urgency in Article 89, paragraph 4, of its Rules. 
 
The judges of ITLOS have followed the ICJ in reading in a requirement that there must be a 
finding that the urgency of a matter justifies the ordering of provisional measures. This 
urgency seems to be qualified on a case-by-case basis. For example, in M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2), 
as the facts unfolded, the most direct measure which had been requested (the release of the 
Master and the crew of the ship) became moot as these people were indeed released. In the 
end, the most direct and important measure finally prescribed by the Tribunal was an order to 
Guinea to refrain from taking or enforcing any judicial or administrative measure against the 
                                                 
75
 M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) (note 26), 37, para. 28. 
76
 Id., paras. 29-30. For further discussion of the M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) case see B. Kwiatkowska, Inauguration 
of the ITLOS Jurisprudence: The Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea M/V Saiga Cases, 30 Ocean 
Development & International Law 43 (1999). 
77
 Southern Bluefin Tuna (note 27), 295, para. 60. This was confirmed in MOX Plant, (note 27), 107, para. 60; 
Land Reclamation (note 25), 19, para. 45. 
78
 S. Rosenne (note 2), at 136, argues that urgency “is the most important of those circumstances”. 
79
 Id., at 135. 
  
ship or the people concerned pending a final decision on the merits.
80
 Although not expressly 
referring to urgency, the Tribunal was clearly concerned with the protection of the rights of 
the parties which were at issue there.
81
 
 
Urgency is also implicit in the requirement that in the circumstances immediate action is 
necessary and cannot wait until a final decision in a case, to protect the rights of both parties 
from irreparable harm.
82
 Thus, the state of proceedings when a request is made and the 
estimated period likely to elapse before a decision on the principal claim will also be elements 
relevant to assessing the urgency of a matter. In this respect, urgency has become linked to the 
gravity of the harm sought to be avoided by a request for provisional measures.  
Rosenne has suggested that a particular question regarding the meaning of “urgency” arises in 
the situation where there are proceedings in ITLOS for the prescription of provisional 
measures but where ITLOS is not seised of the merits. In such cases, he suggests that it would 
normally not be known when the court or tribunal to which the case is being submitted would 
most likely be in a position to act, and thus the question arises how long provisional measures 
prescribed by ITLOS will remain in force.
83
 
 
The Tribunal confronted precisely this question in Southern Bluefin Tuna, where it recalled 
that under Article 290, paragraph 5, of UNCLOS, provisional measures may be prescribed 
pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal agreed upon by the parties if the Tribunal 
considers that the urgency of the situation so requires.
84
 It should also be noted that the 
arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII in this case ultimately decided that it lacked 
jurisdiction, and the measures were “revoked from the day of the signature of [the] Award”.85 
Indeed, in such circumstances provisional measures indicated by a court or tribunal will have 
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produced their effects from the moment of their notification to the parties and “cease to be 
operative” upon delivery of a judgment, thus lapsing at the same moment as delivery of the 
judgment.
86
 The lapse of provisional measures is prospective; they are not invalidated or 
declared void ab initio.
87
 
 
In MOX Plant, another case in which the Tribunal was called upon to prescribe provisional 
measures under Article 290, paragraph 5, the emphasis was again placed on the factual 
circumstances and whether these made it necessary to determine whether the prescription of 
measures was appropriate as a matter of urgency, which the Tribunal did not find to exist.
88
 
 
Finally, the question whether the criterion of urgency is assessed differently in requests under 
Article 290, paragraph 5, arose in Land Reclamation where, upon Malaysia’s request for 
provisional measures, Singapore responded that as the arbitral tribunal was to be constituted 
only a month later, there would be no need to prescribe provisional measures given the short 
period of time remaining before that date. ITLOS rejected Singapore’s argument, pointing out 
that there was nothing in Article 290 of the Convention to suggest that the measures it 
prescribes must be confined to the period ending with the composition of the arbitral tribunal, 
and also noted that the provisional measures it prescribes could remain applicable following 
the constitution of an arbitral tribunal.
89
 
 
III. Prevention of Serious Harm to the Marine Environment 
 
As the objective of preventing serious harm to the marine environment embodied in Article 
290, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS is a criterion which distinguishes the practice of courts and 
tribunals vested with jurisdiction under UNCLOS from that of other comparable bodies such 
as the ICJ (in its exercise of its general jurisdiction, not its jurisdiction based on UNCLOS), it 
deserves brief mention.
90
 First, it bears recalling that the prevention of “serious harm” here is 
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not purely an analogy to the obligation to prevent irreparable harm embodied in the criterion 
of urgency; it is a Convention-specific aim relating purely to the marine environment. 
Secondly, the use of the disjunctive “or” in Article 290, paragraph 1, suggests that measures 
concerning the marine environment may be prescribed in addition to measures protecting the 
rights of the parties; these objectives need not necessarily exclude one another.
91
 A more 
delicate question is, however, whether the preservation of the marine environment may be 
justified not only in the interest of a party to a specific dispute, but also in regard to a more 
general interest. Thus far, such measures have always been requested from the Tribunal by 
one of the parties to a dispute, although it bears noting that the parties have also suggested or 
claimed that the measures requested are justified in the general interest.
92
 It remains an open 
question whether the Tribunal will, when faced with a request for provisional measures by a 
party which does not invoke a general interest, go beyond such a request in ordering such 
provisional measures as to preserve the general interest. 
 
If the general interest was at issue, according to Article 290, paragraph 4, of UNCLOS the 
Tribunal would be bound to notify other States Parties to the Convention which it might 
consider appropriate, but this should not be stretched so far as to suggest that such measures 
automatically concern a broader, general interest. The better view is that these measures 
should be enforced under the supervised information of other states.
93
 Moreover, the Tribunal 
should studiously ensure that the measures it may give do not exceed the purpose of 
provisional measures in order to reach a broader policy objective, as it has been criticized for 
doing in the past.
94
 Whilst certainly the Tribunal has a constructive role to play in the 
clarification of the law which it is entrusted to apply, the provisional measures phase is 
certainly not the appropriate stage for the Tribunal – or any other international court or 
tribunal – to dabble in the development of international law. Issues of substance should 
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invariably be treated in connection with the merits of a case in order to allow parties to 
present their views and for the Tribunal to deliberate properly. 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
By partly drawing inspiration from the International Court of Justice yet adapting the 
practices of that court to the exigencies of the Tribunal’s role under UNCLOS, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has made a valuable contribution to the 
development of the international law governing provisional measures. Although it has been 
seised of such requests only four times, it is almost certain that, in an age of increasing 
recourse to international judicial bodies in order to resolve disputes between states, the 
Tribunal’s contribution will continue to grow. From the vantage point of The Hague and the 
International Court of Justice, this is surely a development to be welcomed, as it strengthens 
the confidence of the community of states in the judicial settlement of international disputes 
and continues to promote the rule of law on the international plane. 
